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Isolation or Interdependence? 
Competing Visions of Independence 
  
The Scottish electorate have been presented with two contrasting visions of what it would 
mean for Scotland to be an independent country. For the UK government and Better Together, 
it would mean Scotland standing alone, isolated from the rest of the UK and lacking influence 
in the world. For the Scottish government and Yes Scotland, independence would mark a new 
relationship between the nations of these islands, with continued and extensive co-operation 
in a partnership of equals. This paper reflects upon the prospects for intergovernmental co-
operation in the event of independence by looking across the Irish Sea. It is in three parts. The 
first considers the evolution of British-Irish relations. The second considers north-south 
relations on the island of Ireland. The third draws what insights these comparative examples 
lend to the debate over Scotland’s constitutional future and the prospects for Scottish-rUK 
relations in the event of independence.   
 
1. British-Irish Relations 
Since the Treaty settlement that put Ireland on the road to independence, the UK and Ireland 
have shared a degree of interdependence, albeit to varying degrees. The two governments 
formally reached agreement in the 1950s that citizens of both countries could continue to 
move freely throughout what became known as the common travel area (later enshrined in 
the 1997 EU Amsterdam Treaty) . Nonetheless, for much of the 20th century, relations were 
often strained. Successive British governments kept Ireland at arms’ length in an effort to 
remove ‘the Irish question’ from the domestic political agenda. After the emergence of the 
Troubles and the imposition of direct rule in 1972, the Irish question once more dominated 
British politics. From an Irish perspective, Ireland remained dependent culturally and 
especially economically upon Britain for much of the 20th century, including with a currency 
pegged to sterling. When the British pound was devalued, so too was the Irish punt. 
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When the British government opted to join the European Economic Community (as it was 
then), Ireland joined simultaneously. 
 
Membership of the European Union was a central factor that changed the nature of that 
relationship. Ireland and the UK remained economically interdependent, but other trading 
relationships flourished and reduced Irish dependence. For Ireland, and especially the Irish 
government, Brussels slowly exerted a gravitational pool, heightening the importance of Irish-
EU relations. This marked a shift in Irish-British relations from post-colonial dependence to a 
‘normal’ relationship between neighbouring sovereign states.  
 
The conflict in Northern Ireland and the partnership approach to the peace process, especially 
under the leadership of Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern, helped to strengthen and institutionalise 
the new British-Irish relationship. Bilateral engagement built inter-governmental trust and 
networks of engagement that helped to develop the relationship across many other policy 
spheres, with the UK and Ireland often pursuing a common 
agenda in EU negotiations. The relative peace in Northern 
Ireland has also meant that it is no longer a ‘first order issue’ 
for the UK government, helping to normalise British-Irish 
relations. The relationship was strengthened further by the 
affinity between the two Heads of State. Mary McAleese had 
made ‘building bridges’ toward reconciliation the defining 
theme of her presidency, culminating in the Queen’s visit to 
Dublin in 2011 – the first by a British monarch since Irish 
independence. The symbolic significance of this visit, which 
included laying a wreath at the Garden of Remembrance where 
those who fought for Irish independence are commemorated, 
paved the way for a new era in British-Irish intergovernmental 
relations.      
 
British-Irish Intergovernmental Institutions 
 
The Good Friday Agreement provided a formal structure for UK-Irish relations. These are 
formally underpinned by two institutions – the British-Irish Inter-governmental Conference 
and the British-Irish Council.   
“no-one who looked to the 
future over the past centuries 
could have imagined the 
strength of the bonds that are 
now in place between the 
governments and the people 
of our two nations, the spirit 
of partnership that we now 
enjoy, and the lasting 
rapport between us.” 
 Queen Elizabeth 
speech at Dublin Castle, 2011 
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 The British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference replaced the Anglo-Irish 
Intergovernmental Council and the Intergovernmental Conference established under 
the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. The BIIGC has a permanent secretariat based in 
Belfast, and met regularly during suspension of devolution in the north. The last 
summit through this forum was held in 2007. 
 
 The British-Irish Council is a multi-lateral forum involving the UK government, the 
UK devolved administrations and the crown dependencies. The Council’s objectives 
were to foster and strengthen practical relationships across the British Isles, and to 
encourage communication and co-operation between governments. Its secretariat is 
based in Edinburgh and its work spans a broad range of policy spheres, including 
energy, environment, early years, health, demography, digital inclusion, tourism and 
transport. 
 
Research interviews suggest that the BIC is viewed positively as a forum of good 
communication, but without much expectation that it will produce significant outcomes. One 
official from Northern Ireland suggested its work streams were ‘searching for a role’, since the 
areas of work are already the subject of bilateral exchanges. Another from the Irish Republic 
suggested its meetings were ‘a bit set piece’ and could be more effective. A UK official 
underlined the importance of the BIC for the networking opportunities it creates for officials, 
and its symbolic status for Northern Ireland, but noted that it was never intended to be a 
decision-making body. The BIC is viewed more positively for the smaller administrations 
than the sovereign states, in spite of the privileged position the latter enjoy within it. The Irish 
government has shown more commitment to the BIC than has the UK government. But the 
close relationship currently being forged between the UK and Irish government is entirely 
outside of the BIC framework. 
 
A New Partnership: Bilateral Relations under Cameron and Kenny 
Outside of this statutory forum, there has been a step-change in British-Irish 
intergovernmental co-ordination, building on the feelings of goodwill generated by, and 
reflected in, the Queen’s visit to Ireland in 2011. These relations go beyond issues related to 
the peace process. The Joint Statement in 2012, signed by the Prime Minister and the 
Taoiseach, underlined the close relationship between the two countries, founded in history, 
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culture, business and family ties, and pointed to their shared interest and co-operation in 
trade and EU relations. The Joint Statement underlined a commitment to ‘a decade of renewed 
and strengthened co-operation between our two countries’, and kick-started an intensive joint 
work programme involving departments across the UK and Irish governments, with annual 
leader summits as well as regular meetings and extensive networking among senior civil 
servants led by the Permanent Secretary/Secretary General; 2012 saw around a dozen such 
meetings to explore and implement the goals set down by the two leaders.   
 
The evaluation report, jointly commissioned by the two governments, revealed the depth of 
economic relations between the UK and Ireland: 
 
 The UK remains Ireland’s largest export destination, with 16% of total industrial exports in 2011 
and 18.5% of service exports.  
 Ireland is the 5th largest recipient of UK industrial exports - almost 6% of the total 
 The stock of UK’s Foreign Direct Investment in Ireland in 2011 was $69.21bn; Ireland’s stock of 
FDI in the UK was $65.19bn 
 An estimated 208,000 jobs in the UK result from exports to Ireland; an estimated 198,000 Irish 
jobs depend on exports to the UK 
  
The nature of the UK-Irish economic relationship has changed in recent decades. Although 
still important for both nation-states, Irish dependence on the UK for both imports and as an 
export destination has declined significantly since Ireland joined the EU. Ireland also has an 
important economic, as well as political, relationship with the United States - the US is its 
most important single country partner for trade in goods - and the health of the Irish 
economy has been dependent upon FDI, especially from US multinationals. The evaluation 
report identified opportunities for closer co-operation across a range of sectors to facilitate 
trade, economic growth, security, including energy security, and health and well-being.  
 
These recommendations have been incorporated into a joint work programme spanning 
around a dozen policy fields. Officials underlined that departments in both governments are 
being steered towards “co-operation beyond the norm”. Already in 2011, the two 
governments had signed an agreement initiating a strategic joint work programme to 
enhance the security of the external border of the Common Travel Area, and to promote 
further cooperation in the area of mutual visa recognition, ‘possibly up to a fully-common 
“We intend that this Joint Statement will 
be the starting point for realising the 
potential over the next decade of even 
stronger relations for current and future 
generations living on these islands.”  
 
Joint Statement by the  
Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, 2012 
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short stay visit visa’; a visa waiver scheme is currently being piloted. In 2013, the two 
governments also agreed a Memorandum of Understanding committing them to work 
towards an agreement on renewable energy, which would see Ireland generate substantial 
wind energy, funded by the UK government, to help meet energy demand in England and 
help the UK meet its renewable targets.  
 
Key Insights from the UK-Irish relationship 
 
2. North-South Relations on the Island of Ireland 
On the island of Ireland, formal north-south cooperation takes place under the auspices of 
the North-South Ministerial Council (NSMC). The NSMC was set up to ‘develop consultation, 
co-operation and action within the island of Ireland - including through implementation on an all-
island and cross-border basis - on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the 
Administrations, North and South’ (GFA, 1998). Based in Armagh, close to the Irish border, the 
NSMC is staffed by a joint secretariat of around 25 civil servants from north and south of the 
border who, while remaining accountable to their respective ministers, have developed a 
common working culture and operate as a cohesive unit.  
 
 Interpersonal links matter. Current UK-Irish relations are facilitated by the personal chemistry 
between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, as well as the close working relationship and mutual 
trust forged among officials 
 In spite of the resource disparities between the two countries, officials from both governments 
confirmed that the relationship is conducted as an equal partnership. Ireland’s embeddedness within 
the EU has helped it to decrease its dependence on the UK, and engage more confidently as a 
neighbouring sovereign state. 
 Ireland is the UK’s closest ally in Europe and, in spite of its size, it remains an important trading 
partner 
 The UK remains Ireland’s most important single country partner, but in many areas of public policy, 
the EU is the main focus of Ireland’s intergovernmental engagement.  
 The Irish government also has a ‘special relationship’ with the United States, including annual leader 
summits, and has negotiated bilateral agreements with a wide range of countries beyond the EU, e.g. 
over the mutual recognition of pensions and social insurance contributions.  
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The NSMC meets in plenary format to oversee co-operation 
on the island of Ireland. Plenary meetings take place (on 
average) two times per year and involve delegations led by 
the FM and DFM from the Northern Ireland Executive and 
the Taoiseach. More frequent meetings, involving relevant 
ministers from both administrations, are held in sectoral 
format in legally designated areas of co-operation: 
agriculture, education, health, environment, tourism and 
transport. The main value of these meetings has been to 
develop mutual trust and a willingness to communicate and 
co-operate among those who would hitherto have had little 
inclination to do so. Co-decision on all-Ireland initiatives has 
been more limited.  
 
The NSMC also oversees the work of six implementation bodies, covering water-ways, food 
safety, trade and business development, cultural languages, EU special programmes, and the 
loughs that straddle the border. This arbitrary list was the result of horse-trading during 
peace talks, and reflects areas where there was an obvious incentive to cooperate and/or 
which were sufficiently uncontroversial to allay unionist fears that north-south cooperation 
may be a step towards integration. The bodies report to the NSMC twice a year, though in 
practice operate largely autonomously. Their policy programmes are developed in 
collaboration with the respective governments (separately) and the NSMC, and are overseen 
by a Board of Directors.  
 
As in British-Irish relations, co-operation also takes place outside of these formal GFA 
frameworks. The most obvious and most effective area of cooperation is in energy, where 
the Irish and UK governments, through the Northern Ireland Office, had been meeting since 
before devolution to facilitate co-operation towards an all-island electricity market. As well 
as co-operation between the regulatory bodies in a Single Electricity Market (SEM) 
committee, officials from both departments meet regularly as a Joint Steering Group. 
Originally set up to introduce the SEM, the Joint Steering group now covers a wide range of 
energy policy issues and work programmes, driven in part by the need to co-ordinate the 
implementation of energy-related EU directives. 
 
  
“The NSMC Joint Secretariat in 
Armagh… is a living example of 
civil servants working and 
learning together to provide 
shared services… (with) intimate 
and intensive experience of 
helping both systems to cooperate 
and any part of either system can 
plug into this knowledge.” 
Michael D’Arcy, 2012  
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Co-operation in the Border Region 
Some of the most extensive engagement has been in the border region. This has been 
strengthened by the removal of official border checkpoints and the activities of north-south 
implementation bodies, such as InterTradeIreland, whose remit is to foster cross-border 
trade. Cross-border collaboration has also been facilitated by EU funding, especially under 
INTERREG and the PEACE programme, which together have brought over €1.9bn in EU 
funding (excluding match-funding) since 1995. These funds are now overseen by the Special 
European Union programmes body – one of the six implementation bodies set up in the 
wake of the GFA. It is anticipated that fewer EU funds will be available in the years to come, 
especially as Northern Ireland moves further from a peace process to ‘normal’ politics. 
 
Particular successes in cross-border co-operation have been evident at a local level, most 
notably in the Co-operation and Working Together (CAWT) programme, to facilitate cross-
border collaborative working in health and social care. Its projects include managing the EU 
INTERREG IVA projects intended to remove border barriers, including through cross-
border co-operation to support older people, children, people with autism disabilities and 
diabetes, and to promote social inclusion and labour mobility (http://www.cawt.com/). A 
recent report – based on interviews with officials – made the case for closer cross-border co-
operation in economic development, health care, tertiary education and infrastructural 
development, but pointed to the practical difficulties in implementing shared public services 
across jurisdictions with have experienced 90 years of different institutional development 
(D’Arcy, 2012).  
 
Further co-operation was fostered during the period of Irish economic growth, with the 
South investing in new hospitals, scholarships, research institutes, and the promise of 
improved transport links, including a Dublin-Derry road. Fiscal austerity - coupled with a 
change of administration in the south - has forced a retreat from many of these investments 
and encouraged the administration to focus on more domestic concerns. There remains a 
pragmatic incentive towards pooling resources, especially in health care, with north-south 
co-operation now less about the peace process and more about value-for-money. For 
example, the health ministers in Northern Ireland (a DUP minister) and the Irish Republic 
are currently examining an all-island approach to the provision of specialist cardiac 
paediatric surgery, which would see the concentration of resources centred in Dublin. The 
two governments have also combined to jointly invest in a Derry-based hospital which will 
provide services for patients north and south of the border, including building a new 
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radiotherapy unit for patients with cancer. But, domestic political and financial pressures 
mean that services such as health and education remain predominantly territorially-
bounded within respective ‘national’ spheres, creating only limited scope for all-island 
decision-making. 
 
3. Insights for Scotland 
 
In the event of Scottish independence, relations between Scotland and the rest of the UK 
would have a very different starting point from the intergovernmental relations outlined in 
this paper. The world in which these relations would take shape is very different from that 
in which Ireland developed as an independent nation-state, and Scotland’s position within 
the Union has never had the colonial features that characterised the history of Ireland. 
Further, on the island of Ireland, North-South relations are being developed against the 
backdrop of the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process, as well as very separate 
institutional and political developments between north and south. Scotland has no recent 
history of political violence and Scottish-rUK relations would be founded upon a more 
integrated history, notwithstanding the distinctiveness of many Scottish institutions before 
and after devolution. In particular, the history of a shared civil service, wider shared public 
apparatus and the shared knowledge and mutual trust these have generated among public 
servants, would mean fewer practical barriers to north-south co-operation than those 
evident in Ireland.  
 
There are, however, useful insights that the Irish experience can lend should Scotland and 
rUK need to develop relations as two sovereign states. Six are listed here: 
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The references to shared histories and interests set out in the 2012 Joint Statement signed by 
the PM and the Taoiseach could easily be applied to the Scottish-UK context, where the 
economic relationship is even stronger: 
 Scotland’s Global Connections Survey estimated £26bn in Scottish international exports 
in 2011, but almost twice as much (£48bn) in exports to the rest of the UK 
 Exports from the rest of the UK to Scotland were an estimated £48.5 billion, making 
Scotland the second biggest market (after the US) for goods and services produced in rUK  
While rUK could be expected to be an independent Scotland’s most important single-country 
partner, investing in other bilateral and multilateral economic and political relationships, 
especially with the EU institutions, can help to avoid the Scotland-rUK relationship being 
characterised by dependence, and make the equality of status of both partners more meaningful 
in spite of inequalities in size and resource. 
Effective intergovernmental co-ordination requires mutual trust, goodwill, interpersonal links 
and a perception that co-operation will bring mutual benefit. 
Just as the trust built up during the peace process has helped to facilitate a better British-Irish 
intergovernmental relationship, we can expect that Scottish-UK inter-governmental relations in 
the event of Scottish independence (or indeed even in its absence) could be coloured by the 
manner in which the referendum and post-referendum negotiations are conducted. The 
Edinburgh Agreement is important in this respect, but not sufficient if overtaken by events. 
Formal intergovernmental institutions can encourage co-operation and help to generate 
goodwill, shared knowledge and understanding across jurisdictional boundaries. An 
institutional forum for the border region could help to foster joint public service provision, 
minimise the effect of border barriers and capitalise on EU support for cooperation across 
borders. 
Bilateral exchange – formal or informal - is more important and conducive to joint decision-
making than multi-lateral forums such as the British-Irish Council.  Strong historical, political, 
economic and cultural links would be a solid basis for continued bilateral exchange. A 
continued commitment to bilateral exchange will be necessary to facilitate co-operation in the 
longer term.  
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